We analyze the design of policies to promote e¢cient distributed generation (DG) of electricity. The optimal policy varies with the set of instruments available to the regulator and with the prevailing DG production technology. DG capacity charges often play a valuable role in inducing optimal investment in DG capacity, allowing payments for DG production to induce the optimal production of electricity using non-intermittent DG technologies. Net metering can be optimal in certain settings, but often is not optimal, especially for non-intermittent DG technologies.
Introduction
The distributed generation of electricity is already pervasive in many countries and is expanding rapidly throughout the world. 1 Distributed generation (DG) can take many forms, including roof-top solar panels, wind turbines, and natural gas-based reciprocating engines or turbines. DG is popular in part because it can limit the amount of capacity required at the primary production site, reduce electricity distribution costs (by moving generation sites closer to Önal consumers), and reduce generation externalities (e.g., carbon emissions). 2 In addition to its many potential beneÖts, DG introduces at least two policy challenges that presently are the subject of heated debate. 3 First, depending upon the established retail prices for electricity and the terms of compensation for DG investment and production, electricity customers may undertake excessive or insu¢cient DG investment and production (Wiser et al., 2007; Borenstein, 2015) . Second, as customers generate some or all of the electricity they consume, the centralized supplier of electricity (ìthe utilityî) experiences declines in revenue that typically exceed the associated avoided costs, given the large Öxed infrastructure costs of the typical utility (Linvill et al. 2013; Lively and Cifuentes, 2014; Perez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014) .
At least three changes have been proposed to help ensure the solvency of electric utilities while encouraging e¢cient DG investment and production. First, revised retail rate structures have been proposed. Rate structures that entail higher Öxed charges for the right to purchase electricity from the utility and lower marginal charges for electricity actually purchased from the utility can better align the utilityís revenues and costs in the presence of widespread DG (Brown and Faruqui, 2014; Costello, 2015) . 4 provide some guidance to policymakers on this important matter. We characterize the retail tari §s, payments for DG production, and charges for DG capacity investment that maximize consumer welfare while ensuring the solvency of the regulated utility. Our analysis allows for both intermittent and non-intermittent DG technologies. Solar panels constitute an intermittent technology in the sense that the amount of electricity produced by the installed capacity is largely exogenous, dictated primarily by environmental conditions (especially the prevailing level of sunshine). In contrast, resources such as fuel cells, gas turbines, and reciprocating engines (which employ natural gas as the primary fuel) constitute nonintermittent DG technologies because the amount of electricity produced by the installed capacity is readily controlled. 8 We begin by analyzing a setting in which smart meters are deployed ubiquitously and the regulator can set real-time retail prices and DG payments. 9 In this setting, retail electricity prices and payments for DG production are both set equal to the utilityís prevailing marginal cost of generating electricity under an optimal policy. These retail prices and DG payments ensure the e¢cient consumption and production of electricity, given installed generating capacities. Charges on installed DG capacity that reáect the associated increase (or decrease) in the utilityís transmission and distribution costs then induce e¢cient DG capacity investment. The identical retail prices and DG payments imply that net metering as described above is optimal. Furthermore, the ability to set di §erent retail prices or DG payments for di §erent consumers or for di §erent DG technologies would not enhance consumer welfare.
We also consider a setting where the regulator can only establish time-of-use retail prices of DG compensation policies, but abstracts from such elements as the full impact of DG investment on a consumerís energy costs. Brown and Sappington (2017a) examine whether common net metering policies are ever optimal in a setting where the regulatorís retail pricing instruments are limited, DG capacity payments are not feasible, and only one (fully intermittent) DG production technology is available. 8 Solar panels account for the majority of DG capacity in most U.S. states, due in part to the rapid decline in the cost of solar panels in recent years . However, natural gas-based DG conÖgured in combined heat and power (CHP) mode account for the majority of DG capacity in Connecticut and New York (DNV GL, 2014) . CHP units can be of particular value as a reliable alternative source of electricity when primary sources fail (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013). 9 Smart meters permit precise measurement of the amount of electricity that is consumed at each moment in time, thereby admitting (real-time) prices that can vary from one instant to the next. and time-of-production DG payments. These prices and payments can vary across pre-speciÖed time periods each day, but cannot vary within a time period. To induce desired levels of electricity consumption in this setting, the retail prices are set so that a weighted average of expected deviations of price from the utilityís marginal cost of production is zero.
In Ramsey-like fashion (Ramsey, 1927; Baumol and Bradford, 1970) , the weights on deviations between price and cost reáect corresponding price sensitivities of the demand for electricity. To induce desired levels of electricity production from non-intermittent DG technologies, payments for such production are set equal to the utilityís expected marginal cost of production during the relevant time period. To induce desired DG capacity investment, DG capacity charges are set to equate the consumerís marginal expected return from increasing DG capacity with the corresponding net reduction in the utilityís production cost.
This net reduction is the di §erence between the marginal reduction in the utilityís expected generation costs and the marginal increase (or decrease) in the utilityís transmission and distribution costs as DG capacity expands.
Because payments for DG production do not a §ect the amount of electricity produced with a given level of intermittent DG capacity, a regulator who can impose DG capacity charges has considerable áexibility in setting payments for electricity produced with the intermittent DG technology. In particular, the regulator can equate these payments either with the corresponding payments for electricity produced using the non-intermittent DG technology or with the corresponding retail rates for electricity. Consequently, neither a requirement to set the same DG payments for both technologies nor a requirement to implement the common net metering policy for the intermittent technology would, in isolation, constrain the regulator. However, the imposition of both requirements simultaneously would reduce the level of welfare the regulator can secure for consumers.
When social losses from externalities associated with electricity production are present, the foregoing Öndings are modiÖed in intuitive fashion. In particular, retail electricity prices are optimally increased to discourage the purchase of electricity from the utility as the social losses from externalities associated with electricity production by the utility increase.
In addition, DG payments for electricity produced using the non-intermittent technology increase as marginal social losses from externalities associated with this production decline relative to the marginal social losses associated with electricity production by the utility.
Thus, more generous payments for electricity produced by ìcleanerî DG technologies are optimal, ceteris paribus.
Overall, our Öndings imply that there is no single DG compensation policy that is optimal in all settings. The optimal policy varies with the instruments available to the regulator and with the relevant DG production technologies. Our Öndings also stress the important role of DG capacity charges. When these charges are feasible, the regulator can set them to induce e¢cient DG capacity investment while employing payments for DG production to induce e¢cient levels of electricity production. Net metering can be optimal in certain settings when DG capacity charges are feasible. However, when the regulator is unable to impose capacity charges, payments for DG production must serve to induce desired levels of both DG production and DG capacity investment. This dual role of payments for DG production complicates their design, limits the settings in which net metering is optimal, raises industry production costs, and reduces the level of welfare that can be secured for consumers.
We develop and explain these Öndings as follows. Section 2 presents the key features of our formal model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal policy in the setting where the regulator can set real-time retail prices and DG payments. Section 4 examines the changes to the optimal policy that arise in the presence of social losses from externalities. Section 5 identiÖes the key features of the optimal policy when the regulator can set time-of-use retail prices and time-of-production DG payments. Section 6 describes the optimal policy when the regulatorís instruments are more limited, i.e., when retail rates cannot vary across demand periods or across customers, and when DG capacity charges are not feasible. Section 7 employs numerical solutions to illustrate how the optimal regulatory policy and industry outcomes change when the regulator is able to set DG capacity charges. Section 8 reviews 5 the policy implications of our Öndings and suggests directions for further research.
Model Elements
For expositional ease, we focus on a setting where a vertically-integrated supplier (S) generates electricity, supplies it to consumers, and operates the sole transmission and distribution network. However, the ensuing analysis also applies in settings where the electricity supplier operates in a restructured market, purchasing electricity on a wholesale exchange where an independent system operator dispatches supply in order of increasing cost. Also for expositional ease, we assume there are two consumers, D and N , who purchase electricity from S. Consumer D also can undertake distributed generation (DG) of electricity, whereas consumer N cannot do so. 10
There are two periods of demand for electricity, e.g., a high-demand period (H) and a lowdemand period (L). Consumer j 2 fD; N g derives value V j t (x; * s ) from x units of electricity in state * s 2 [ * t ; * t ] in demand period t 2 fL; Hg. This value is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of x. The state variable * s might reáect, for instance, the amount of sunshine that prevails at a speciÖed time during the relevant demand period. Under this interpretation, higher realizations of * s in hot climates might correspond to times at which relatively intense sunshine raises ambient temperatures, thereby increasing the value that consumers derive from electricity (to power cooling units). 11 The distribution function for the state variable in period t is F t ($). The corresponding density function is f t ($).
We will consider settings where the regulator can, and other settings where she cannot, set retail prices for electricity and payments for electricity produced via DG that vary with the realized state. In settings where the regulator can set such ìreal-time prices,î r jt (* s ) will denote the retail price that consumer j must pay to S for each unit of electricity he 10 Our qualitative conclusions are unchanged if there are multiple identical D consumers and multiple indentical N consumers. 11 Formally, in hot climates, @V j t (x;%s) @%s % 0 and @ 2 V j t (x;%s) @%s@x % 0 for all x % 0 and $ s 2 [ $ t ; $ t ], for j 2 fD; N g. These inequalities need not hold more generally. The Öndings reported below hold even if these inequalities do not hold. 6 consumes in state * s in period t. 12 Consumer j 2 fD; N g also must pay the Öxed charge R j for the right to purchase electricity from S. 13
Consumer jís demand for electricity in state * s in period t is X j t (r jt (* s ); r jt 0 (! t 0 ); * s ),
where r jt 0 (! t 0 ) is the vector of retail prices that consumer j might potentially face in period t 0 6 = t (t; t 0 2 fL; Hg), depending on the realization of the state variable. 14 Aggregate
In addition to purchasing electricity from S, consumer D can produce electricity himself using an intermittent and/or a non-intermittent DG technology. The key di §erence between the technologies pertains to the consumerís control over electricity production (dispatch) after installing generating capacity. For simplicity, consumer D is assumed to have no residual control over the electricity he produces using the intermittent DG technology (e.g., solar panels 
13 This formulation admits di §erent retail prices for di §erent consumers. The ensuing discussion also will consider settings in which such price discrimination is not feasible. 14 X j t (r jt ($ s ); r jt 0 (! t 0 ); $ s ) is a strictly decreasing function of r jt ($ s ) and a non-decreasing function of each element of r jt 0 (! t 0 ). Here and throughout the ensuing analysis, we abstract from income e §ects in assuming that the Öxed charge does not a §ect a consumerís demand for electricity. 15 The precise placement of solar panels and the surrounding foliage or the adjacent structures at a speciÖc location can cause electricity production to vary at di §erent times of the day, holding constant the amount of sunshine that prevails in a geographic region. 16 The presumed linear relationship between output and capacity is adopted for expositional simplicity and does not a §ect the qualitative conclusions drawn below. 7 and marginal cost of producing electricity in each demand period. Formally, The regulator speciÖes the compensation that S must deliver to consumer D for the DG capacity he installs. k 0y is the Öxed payment that S must make to consumer D when he installs any strictly positive amount of capacity in DG technology y 2 fi; ng. k y is the additional payment that S must make to consumer D for each unit of capacity of technology y he installs. 19 These payments can be negative, in which case S is authorized to impose capacity charges on consumer D.
The regulator also speciÖes the compensation that S must deliver to consumer D for the electricity he produces. w yt (* s ) is the payment S must make to consumer D for each unit of electricity he produces using technology y 2 fi; ng in state * s in period t. 20 S delivers this payment to consumer D even if consumer D ultimately consumes the unit of electricity in question, and consumer D pays the prevailing retail charge for each unit of electricity 17 Formally,
@K Dy = 0 for y 2 fi; ng and limit
19 Capacity is measured in MWs. 20 S must deliver this payment to consumer D regardless of whether he produces more or less electricity than he consumes. 8 he consumes, regardless of the source of the electricity. The common net metering policy prevails if w yt (* s ) = r jt (* s ) in each period t and state * s , for both technologies (y 2 fi; ng) and both consumers (j 2 (D; N g). 21
Sís variable cost of generating Q v t units of electricity in period t when it has K G units of
. Increased generating capacity reduces at a diminishing rate Sís variable and marginal cost of generating electricity. 22 Sís cost of installing K G units of generating capacity is C K (K G ), which is an increasing, convex function. 23
The electricity supplier also incurs transmission, distribution and network management (TDM) costs T (K G ; K Di ; K Dn ) to support centralized and distributed generating capacities (K G , K Di , and K Dn ) and to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of the electricity produced by these capacities. 24 These costs include: (i) the costs of voltage and frequency control equipment required to manage the dual áow of electricity to and from customer premises;
and (ii) the costs of ensuring network reliability in the presence of an intermittent supply of electricity, which may entail, for instance, costs associated with quick-start reserve generation capacity. For simplicity, we abstract from variable TDM costs (e.g., line losses) that might arise even when adequate infrastructure is implemented to fully accommodate electricity produced by the installed generating capacity. 25
The regulator chooses her policy instruments to maximize the expected welfare of the two consumers during the two demand periods while ensuring non-negative expected proÖt 21 Consumer D is fully compensated in each period for all of the electricity he produces in the period. 22 Formally,
We also assume a strictly positive level of generating capacity is optimal. This will be the case if, for example, limit
The electricity supplierís choice of generating capacity is relevant only in settings where the electricity market has not been restructured, so S is a vertically-integrated supplier. All elements of the ensuing analysis other than the choice of capacity are relevant in both restructured and non-restructured electricity markets. 24 For expositional ease, the ensuing discussion focuses on settings where T ($) is increasing in each of its arguments. Section 7 explicitly considers settings where DG capacity investments reduce Sís TDM costs. 25 Although local distribution networks can experience substantial line losses on occasion, system-wide line losses typically are relatively small in practice (Parsons and Brinckerho §, 2012 ; U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2014b). Explicit accounting for these variable costs would not a §ect the key qualitative conclusions reported below. 9 for S. The regulatorís policy instruments are the retail prices for electricity, the terms of the DG compensation that S must deliver to consumer D, and Sís generating capacity.
Consumer N ís welfare (U N ($)) is the di §erence between the value he derives from the electricity he consumes and the amount he pays for the electricity. Formally, consumer N ís expected welfare is, for t 0 6 = t (t; t 0 2 fL; Hg):
Consumer Dís welfare (U D ($)) is the sum of the value he derives from the electricity he consumes and the compensation he receives for installing DG capacity and producing electricity, less the amount he pays for the electricity he purchases from S and his costs of DG investment and production. Formally, consumer Dís expected welfare is, for t 0 6 = t (t; t 0 2 fL; Hg):
Sís proÖt ( @ ) is the revenue it secures from selling electricity to consumers D and N , less the sum of: (i) the DG compensation it pays to consumer D; (ii) the cost of its generating capacity; (iii) its cost of generating electricity; and (iv) its TDM costs. Formally, Sís expected proÖt is:
( 3 ) The timing in the model is as follows. The regulator Örst sets her policy instruments.
Consumer D then chooses his DG capacity investments. Finally, the state is realized, DG production occurs, and S supplies the realized demand for electricity and provides all required TDM services. 26
State-SpeciÖc Pricing and DG Compensation
We Örst examine the optimal regulatory policy in a setting where smart meters are deployed ubiquitously and the regulator can set prices and DG payments that vary with the realized state variable in each demand period. The regulatorís problem in this setting,
, and E f @ g are as deÖned in (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
Proposition 1 characterizes the key features of the optimal regulatory policy in this setting.
for each t 2 fL; Hg and * s 2 [ * t ; * t ]; and (iii) k y = ( @T (") @K Dy for y 2 f i; n g .
Conclusion (i) in Proposition 1 indicates that Sís generating capacity is chosen to minimize Sís expected operating costs. In particular, this capacity is optimally increased to the point where the rate at which additional capacity reduces Sís expected generation costs is equal to the rate at which increased capacity increases the sum of Sís capacity costs and associated TDM costs. 26 The sequencing of the two demand periods does not a §ect our Öndings.
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Conclusion (ii) indicates that the unit retail price of electricity and the unit payment for DG production are both optimally set equal to Sís marginal cost of generating electricity in each state. These prices and payments ensure that consumers expand their consumption of electricity to the point where its marginal value is equal to its marginal cost of production in each state, regardless of the dispatachable (non-intermittent) source of production. Thus, the identiÖed retail prices and DG payments ensure the e¢cient consumption and production of electricity, given installed generating capacities. 27 Condition (ii) implies that when Sís marginal cost of generating electricity increases with the amount of electricity it supplies, retail prices and payments for DG production will be highest in states where the demand for Sís electricity is most pronounced.
Conclusion (iii) reports that the optimal unit DG capacity charge is the associated marginal increase in Sís TDM costs, which can vary by technology. 28 When consumer D is compensated for the electricity he produces using the non-intermittent technology at a rate equal to Sís marginal cost of generating electricity, the consumer will install the e¢cient level of K Dn when he is required to bear the associated increment in Sís TDM costs. 29 In essence, this charge, along with the associated payments for DG production, induces consumer D to account fully for the relevant expected social beneÖts and costs of investment in DG capacity.
The fact that the unit payment for DG production and the unit retail price of electricity are equated under the optimal policy identiÖed in Proposition 1 has three important implications. First, net metering (as described in the Introduction) can be optimal for both DG technologies. Second, there is no strict gain from implementing DG compensation that varies by technology. Third, there is no strict gain from setting distinct retail prices for di §erent 27 The Öxed retail charges (R j ) are set to ensure that S earns zero expected proÖt. 28 The increase in Sís TDM costs also can vary substantially across geographic regions. See Shlatz et al. (2013) and Cohen et al. (2015) , for example. 29 The values of w it ($ s ) and k i identiÖed in Proposition 1 are not unique because the values of w it ($ s ) do not a §ect the amount of electricity produced by the installed intermittent capacity. If the w it ($ s ) payments are increased above @C G consumers. 30 In this sense, when state-speciÖc retail pricing and DG payments are feasible, relatively simple DG payment policies can secure the ideal outcome for consumers.
Externalities
The analysis to this point has abstracted from social losses due to externalities (e.g., pollution) associated with the generation of electricity. To account for these losses, let t (Q v t ; Q i t ; Q n t ) denote the social loss from environmental externalities in period t when S produces output Q v t and when consumer D produces output Q i t with the intermittent technology and output Q n t with the non-intermittent technology. 31 DeÖne th ($) ) @ t (") @Q h t % 0 for h 2 fv; i; ng. The regulatorís problem in this setting, [RP-*e ], is to:
subject to: E f @ g % 0 ,
where
, and E f @ g are as deÖned in (1) Proposition 2 reports that in order to induce e¢cient electricity consumption in the presence of externalities, it is optimal to raise the unit retail price of electricity above Sís marginal cost of production by the marginal social loss from externalities associated with Sís production of electricity ( tv ($)). 32 Further, to induce consumer D to produce the e¢cient 30 Retail charges that di §er across consumers can be optimal if the regulator values the welfare of consumer N di §erently from the welfare of consumer D. 31 For simplicity, we assume the social loss from externalities in one period does not vary with outputs produced in the other period. We also assume the total social loss from externalities is the sum of the corresponding losses in each period. 32 If prevailing policies (e.g., carbon taxes) compel electricity producers to fully internalize the social losses from environmental externalities, then the utilityís marginal cost of supplying electricity will reáect both the physical marginal cost of production and the associated marginal social losses from externalities. Fabra and Reguant (2014) Önd that, in practice, taxes on emissions are passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices for electricity.
13 amount of electricity using the non-intermittent technology, it is optimal to increase the corresponding unit DG payment (w nt (* s )) above Sís marginal cost of production by the di §erence between the marginal social loss from externalities due to production by S and by consumer D ( tv ($) ( tn ($)). Thus, DG compensation is increased to the extent that the DG generation technology is ìcleanerî than Sís generation technology, ceteris paribus. 33
Proposition 2 implies that net metering generally is optimal only for electricity produced using a DG technology that generates no social losses from externalities. When retail prices are increased above Sís marginal cost by tv ($) and unit DG payments are increased above Sís marginal cost by tv ($) ( ty ($), the retail prices and DG payments will coincide only if ty ($) = 0. Thus, net metering may be optimal for solar DG production if it generates no social losses from externalities. In contrast, net metering generally is not optimal for DG production using CHP units, for example. Furthermore, even abstracting from di §erences in generating costs, optimal retail prices typically will vary with Sís generating technology. In addition, optimal DG payments typically will vary with the generating technologies employed by both S and consumer D.
TOU Pricing and TOP DG Compensation
In practice, smart meters are not always deployed and employed ubiquitously. Consequently, state-speciÖc retail prices and DG payments are not always feasible. In light of this fact, we now consider the setting where the regulator implements time of use (TOU) retail prices and time of production (TOP) DG payments (in addition to DG capacity charges).
In this setting, the regulator can specify four distinct unit retail prices and four distinct DG payments. The retail prices can vary by customer and by demand period, but cannot vary within a period. The DG payments can vary by DG technology and by demand period, but cannot vary within a demand period. 34 Formally, when only TOU retail prices and TOP 33 Again, the values of w it ($ s ) and k i identiÖed in Proposition 2 are not unique because the w it ($ s ) payments do not a §ect consumer Dís production of electricity using the intermittent DG technology, given installed capacity K Di . 34 In principle, more than two demand periods might be established, thereby allowing the regulator to better approximate the solution to [RP-$]. To illustrate, a regulator might be able to set prices that can di §er in DG payments are feasible, for y 2 fi; ng and t 2 fL; Hg: r jt (* s ) = r jt (* s 0 ) ) r jt and w yt (* s ) = w yt (* s 0 ) ) w yt for all * s ; * s 0 2 [ * t ; * t ] . (8) [RP-t ] will denote the regulatorís problem in this setting with TOU retail pricing and TOP DG payments. Formally, [RP-t ] is problem [RP-*] with the additional restrictions speciÖed in condition (8). Thus, for expositional clarity, we abstract from social losses from externalities. 35 Proposition 3 characterizes the key features of the optimal regulatory policy in this setting.
Proposition 3. At the solution to [RP-t]:
) @X j t 0 ($; * s 0 ) @r jt dF t 0 (* s 0 ) = 0 for t 0 6 = t, t; t 0 2 fL; Hg;
for y 2 f i; n g.
Conclusion (i) in Proposition 3 again indicates that Sís generation capacity (K G ) is
chosen to minimize Sís expected operating costs, which include generation costs, capacity costs, and TDM costs.
Conclusion (ii) reports that the unit retail prices for electricity are set so that expected time periods where the prevailing temperature is expected to be low, moderate, high, or very high. 35 Proposition 6 in Brown and Sappington (2017b) identiÖes how social losses from externalities a §ect the optimal regulatory policy in the present setting.
weighted deviations of prices from the incumbentís marginal cost of generating electricity are zero. Deviations of price from marginal cost are weighted more heavily when consumer demand is more sensitive to price, as under Ramsey pricing. Because price sensitivity can vary between consumers and across demand periods, the regulator typically is able to secure a strictly higher level of expected consumer welfare when she is able to set retail prices and DG payments that vary across consumers and across demand periods. 36
Conclusion (iii) implies that the unit compensation for non-intermittent DG production in period t is optimally set equal to Sís expected marginal cost of generating electricity in period t. By rewarding consumer D for increased DG production at a rate that reáects the associated expected reduction in Sís generation costs, the regulator encourages consumer D to expand his production of electricity from the non-intermittent DG technology to the level that minimizes expected industry generation costs, given installed generation capacities.
Conclusion (iv) indicates that the unit compensation (k n ) for non-intermittent DG investment (K Dn ) is optimally set to induce consumer D to choose the level of K Dn that minimizes expected industry costs, given K G and K Di . This is accomplished by setting k n to equate consumer Dís expected marginal beneÖt from increasing K Di (i.e., k n + P t 2 f L;H g w nt R 2t 2 t @Q n t (";2s) @K Dn dF t (* s )) with the corresponding expected marginal net reduction in Sís costs, which is the difference between the expected marginal reduction in Sís generating costs ( P
) and the marginal increase in Sís TDM costs ( @T (") @K Dn ). Conclusions (iii) and (iv) together imply that the unit capacity payment (k n ) is set to induce the desired capacity investment in the non-intermittent DG technology (K Dn ), given DG payments (w nL and w nH ), whereas these payments are set to induce the desired level of electricity production, given the installed capacity investment (K Dn ).
Conclusion (iv) also reports that the compensation consumer D anticipates for installing intermittent DG capacity (K Di ) and producing electricity using this capacity is optimally set to ensure the consumer chooses the level of K Di that minimizes expected industry production costs, given K G and K Dn . 37 Because consumer D cannot control the amount of electricity produced by each unit of capacity of the intermittent technology, the corresponding unit DG compensation levels (w iL and w iH ) do not a §ect electricity production, given installed capacity K Di . Consequently, the regulator has considerable leeway in setting w iL , w iH , and k i to jointly induce the desired K Di capacity investment. In particular, the regulator can set w iL = w nL and w iH = w nH and adjust k i to induce the desired level of K Di . Therefore, the regulator derives no strict gain from an ability to set technology-speciÖc payments for DG production of electricity in this setting with TOU retail prices and TOP DG compensation. 38 Propositions 1 and 3 also imply that there are conditions under which a restriction to set only TOU prices and TOP DG payments would not constrain the regulator. Specifically, suppose S were certain to operate with a relatively low (base load) marginal cost (c L ) throughout period L and a relatively high (peak load) marginal cost (c H ) throughout period H. Then by implementing marginal-cost prices and payments in each period (i.e., r jL = w yL = c L and r jH = w yH = c H for j = D; N and y = i; n), the regulator could secure the same level of expected consumer welfare with TOU prices and TOP DG payments that she achieves with state-speciÖc prices and payments. Thus, unpredictable within-period variation in the utilityís marginal cost of generating electricity is the source of strict gains from state-speciÖc prices and payments.
Settings with More Restricted Policy Instruments
The preceding analysis assumes the regulator can set retail prices that di §er across consumers and across demand periods. It also assumes the regulator can both set payments for DG production of electricity and specify compensation (or charges) for DG capacity invest- 37 Because S generates the di §erence between the quantity of electricity demanded and the quantity supplied by consumer D,
ment. We now brieáy illustrate how the optimal policy changes when the regulatorís policy instruments are more limited.
No Customer-SpeciÖc Pricing
First consider the optimal regulatory policy when the regulator can set: (i) a single Öxed retail charge for electricity (R) for both consumers; (ii) a single unit retail price (r) of electricity that the two consumers face throughout both demand periods; (iii) a single technology-speciÖc unit payment for DG production (w y for y 2 fi; ng) that prevails in both demand periods; and (iv) technology-speciÖc unit compensation (or charges) for DG capacity (k i and k n ). Let [RP] denote the regulatorís problem in this setting. Because the established value of w i does not a §ect the amount of electricity produced from a given investment in the capacity of the intermittent technology (K Di ), the regulator can set w i = r and adjust k i accordingly to induce the optimal K Di investment. Consequently, net metering for electricity produced with the intermittent DG technology can be optimal. In contrast, net metering for electricity produced with the non-intermittent DG technology generally is not optimal, even in the absence of social losses from externalities.
Proposition 4. At a solution to [RP]: (i)
P j 2 f D;N g P t 2 f L;H g R 2t 2 t h r ( @C G t (Q v t (";2s);K G ) @Q v t (";2s) i @X j t (";2s) @r dF t (* s ) = 0 ; (ii) w n = P t 2 f L;H g R 2t 2 t @C G t (Q v t (";2s);K G ) @Q v t (";2s) dF t (* s ) ; and (iii) k y = P t 2 f L;H g R 2t 2 t h @C G t (Q v t (";2s);K G ) @Q v t (";2s) ( w y i @Q y t (K Dy ;2s) @K Dy dF t (* s ) ( @T (")@K
No DG Capacity Charges
Although DG capacity charges have been proposed in several jurisdictions, they are not presently deployed ubiquitously. 40 When a regulator is unable to implement capacity charges, she must employ payments for DG production to induce desired investment in DG capacity.
Consequently, it typically is no longer optimal to set these payments to induce e¢cient levels of DG electricity production, given installed generating capacities. To illustrate this more general conclusion, consider the setting with state-speciÖc retail prices and DG payments analyzed in section 3, with the exception that the regulator cannot impose any capacity charges (so k 0y = k yt (* s ) = 0 for all y 2 fi; ng, t 2 fL; Hg, and * s 2 [ * t ; * t ]). Let [RP-*k ] denote the regulatorís problem in this setting.
Proposition 5. At a solution to [RP-*k], for all t 2 fL; Hg and * s 2 [ * t ; * t ]: (i)
; and (ii) w yt (* s ) = @C G t (Q v t (";2s); K G ) @Q v t (";2s) ( @T (") @K Dy @K Dy @wyt(2s) h . @Q y t (";2s) @K Dy @K Dy @wyt(2s) + @Q y t (";2s) @wyt(2s)
for y 2 f i; ng. 41 Conclusion (i) in Proposition 5 indicates that in order to induce the e¢cient consumption of electricity, the regulator sets the retail price of electricity equal to Sís marginal cost of generating electricity in each state in each demand period. To induce consumer D to produce the e¢cient level of electricity using the non-intermittent technology, the regulator would like to set each w nt (* s ) payment at this same level. However, these payments would 40 DG capacity charges have been proposed in Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin (NCCETC, 2015d). 41 Conclusion (i) in Proposition 1 also holds and S earns zero expected proÖt at the solution to [RP-$k ].
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induce consumer D to install more than the e¢cient level of capacity of the non-intermittent technology in the absence of a DG capacity charge that reáects the increase in TDM costs that S experiences as K Dn increases. Consequently, as conclusion (ii) in Proposition 5 indicates, the regulator optimally reduces the w nt (* s ) payments below
The amount of the reduction is proportional to the rate at which an increase in the DG payment increases
Sís TDM costs per corresponding unit of increased DG output. 42;43 Proposition 5 indicates that, in contrast to the setting where the regulator can set DG capacity charges, net metering (w yt (* t ) = r yt (* t )) is not optimal for either technology, even in the absence of social losses from externalities. Thus, although such relatively simple DG payments can be optimal when the regulator has access to a full array of policy instruments, these payments typically are not optimal when the regulatorís instruments are more limited, and so she must employ DG payments both to induce desired DG capacity investment and to a §ect DG electricity production given the installed capacities.
Illustrating the Impact of Capacity Charges
We now present numerical solutions to illustrate how the ability to set DG capacity charges a §ects the optimal regulatory policy and industry outcomes. We consider settings where consumer demand for electricity is linear with a price elasticity of ( 0:25 at the expected level of demand and the average retail price of electricity for both consumers in each period. 44 Consumer N is assumed to account for 90% of expected electricity consumption. 42 The numerator of the last term in conclusion (ii) in Proposition 5 for y = n is the rate at which Sís TDM costs increases as w nt ($ s ) increases due to the induced increase in K Di . The denominator of this term reáects the rate at which output produced using the non-intermittent DG technology (Q n t ($)) increases as w nt ($ s ) increases. The increase in Q n t ($) arises from two sources. First, the increase in w nt ($ s ) induces consumer D to increase K Dn , which reduces the consumerís marginal cost of producing electricity, which in turn induces increased production. Second, the increase in w nt ($ s ) increases the prevailing rate of compensation for electricity production, which induces increased production. The corresponding interpretation when y = i is analogous except that an increase in w it ($ s ) only a §ects the amount of electricity produced using the intermittent DG technology by inducing consumer D to increase K Di (i.e., @Q i t (";%s) @wit(%s) = 0). 43 The central considerations that underlie the Öndings in Proposition 5 persist in other settings where the regulatorís instruments are more limited (e.g., where she can only set TOU retail prices and TOP DG payments). 44 Estimates of the short-run price elasticity of demand for electricity for residential consumers range from (0:13 to (0:35. Corresponding long-run estimates range from (0:40 to (0:85 (Espey and Espey, 2004;  20
The ìbaselineî setting we consider is one in which S primarily employs non-coal resources to serve a relatively large number of customers, as in California, for example. The demand parameters in this setting are chosen to equate the relevant equilibrium expected demand in the model with the corresponding average hourly consumption of electricity in California in 2014. (See the Appendix for a detailed speciÖcation of these parameters and the other parameters described below.) The state variable (*) in the peak (o §-peak) period reáects the average utilization rate of solar DG capacity in California in 2014 during the peak (o §-peak) period of demand. The density functions for the state variables are chosen to match the observed data, using maximum likelihood estimation.
Sís capacity costs are taken to be C K (K G ) = 16:1 K G + :00045 (K G ) 2 . Sís TDM costs are assumed to be T (K G ; K Di ; K Dn ) = 2:35 K G + a Di T K Di + 2:35 K Dn , where a Di T = 5:05
initially. Sís cost of generating Q v units of electricity when it has K G units of capacity is C G (Q v ; K G ) = 28:53 Q v +:0015 (Q v ) 2 , reáecting estimates by Bushnell (2007) . The cost of installing K Di units of intermittent DG capacity and K Dn units of non-intermittent DG capacity is assumed to be C K D (K Di ; K Dn ) = 150 K Di + :0038 (K Di ) 2 + 34:09 K Dn + :00313 (K Dn ) 2 .
Finally, we assume that the loss from environmental externalities per MWh of electricity generated is 11:476 under centralized electricity production, 21:029 under non-intermittent (natural gas) DG, and 0 under intermittent (solar) DG. Table 1 denotes the expected proÖt from DG employing technology y 2 fi; ng, where i denotes ìintermittentî and n denotes ìnon-intermittent.î 46 E fc S g is a measure of Sís expected average cost of production, 47 E f g denotes the expected social Paul et al., 2009) . Commercial and industrial customers typically exhibit less elastic demands for electricity (e.g., Wade, 2003; Taylor et al., 2005; Paul et al., 2009) . 45 Brown and Sappington (2017b) review the methodology employed to derive the Öndings in Table 1 . 46 ProÖt is the di §erence between: (i) the sum of payments for DG output and any relevant payments for installing DG capacity; and (ii) the sum of DG capacity costs and any relevant variable costs of DG production. 47 Formally,
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losses from environmental externalities, and E fW g denotes aggregate expected welfare. 48 Because consumer D cannot control the level of output from the intermittent DG (ìDG-iî) technology other than through his choice of capacity (K Di ), w i and k i are redundant instruments for the regulator when both are available. In this event, we assume the regulator implements net metering (w i = r) for the DG-i technology. Table 1 reports that when DG capacity charges are feasible, the regulator optimally provides a payment (k i > 0) for investment in the DG-i technology. 49 The payment increases such investment above the level that net metering alone would induce. When DG capacity charges are not feasible, the unit payment for DG-i output (w i ) is increased substantially (21%) above the unit retail price of electricity (r L = r H ) in order to increase investment in DG-i capacity.
In contrast, the regulator imposes a capacity tax (k n < 0) on the non-intermittent DG (ìDG-nî) technology when DG capacity charges are feasible. Doing so limits excessive investment in DG-n capacity that otherwise arises when w n is set both to induce an e¢cient level of DG-n output and motivate investment in DG-n capacity. The reduction in DG-n capacity that is optimally induced when DG capacity charges are feasible is o §set in part by increased centralized generating capacity (K G ).
The decline in DG-n capacity when capacity charges are feasible causes the proÖt from DG-n operations to decline, which reduces the expected utility of consumer D. 50 Because electricity production is shifted from the relatively ìdirtyî DG-n technology to the relatively ìcleanî centralized production technology, the expected social losses from environmental externalities decline when capacity charges are feasible. Aggregate expected welfare increases 48 Aggregate welfare, W , is the di §erence between consumer welfare and losses from environmental externalities. 49 For expositional ease, the values reported in Table 1 are rounded either to the nearest tenth or the nearest whole number. 50 Consumer N ís expected utility increases because the reduction in Sís expected unit operating cost admits a reduction in the Öxed retail charge that more than o §sets the impact of the higher unit retail price of electricity.
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slightly. 51
Outcomes in the baseline setting are sensitive to the presumed impact of DG on the utilityís TDM costs. Distinct outcomes can arise if DG reduces, rather than increases, TDM costs. To illustrate this conclusion, suppose all parameters are as speciÖed in the baseline setting except a Di T is reduced from 5:05 to (11:0, so investment in the DG-i technology reduces the utilityís TDM costs substantially. 52 As Table 2 reports, the regulator now increases substantially (by 61%) the unit payment for investment in the DG-i technology (k i ). The higher capacity payment induces a substantial (61%) increase in DG-i capacity.
Centralized capacity (K G ) and DG-n capacity decline. The increased investment in DG-i capacity leads to a pronounced (159%) increase in the proÖt from DG-i operations. The expected social losses from externalities decline as a larger fraction of output is derived from the ìcleanî DG-i technology. Brown and Sappington (2017b,c) examine how the outcomes reported in Tables 1 and   2 change as functional forms and parameter values change. 53 The outcomes generally are robust to considerable variation in model speciÖcation.
Conclusions
We have examined the optimal design of policies to promote e¢cient distributed generation (DG) of electricity. Our analysis produced the following seven conclusions that may help to inform the current debate about desirable DG policies.
First, there is no single policy that best promotes e¢cient DG in all settings. The optimal 51 The limited impact of DG capacity charges on aggregate expected welfare reáects in part the limited sensitivity of consumer demand to the price of electricity and the regulatorís unrestricted use of a Öxed retail charge that never induces any customer to cease all electricity purchases. 52 Cohen et al. (2015) report a wide range of estimates of the impact of DG on utility TDM costs. Clean Power Research (2014) estimates that these costs decline by $11:00 for each MWh of PV capacity investment.
policy varies with the characteristics of the prevailing environment, including the set of policy instruments available to the regulator and the relevant DG production technologies.
Second, DG capacity charges enhance consumer welfare in the presence of non-intermittent DG production technologies. The capacity charges can be employed to induce e¢cient investment in DG capacity while payments for electricity produced with the non-intermittent DG technology can be employed to induce e¢cient production levels.
Third, in the absence of social losses from externalities, retail prices and DG payments for electricity that reáect the utilityís marginal cost of generating electricity induce both the e¢cient consumption of electricity and the e¢cient allocation of electricity production among industry suppliers. Therefore, common net metering policies (whereby the unit payment for distributed production of electricity is set equal to the prevailing retail price of electricity)
can be part of an optimal policy. This is the case as long as DG capacity charges are set to reáect the impact of increased DG capacity on the utilityís transmission, distribution, and network management costs.
Fourth, when state-speciÖc (e.g., real time) prices and DG payments are not feasible but DG capacity charges are feasible, the optimal unit DG payment for electricity reáects the utilityís expected marginal cost of generating electricity. In contrast, the optimal unit retail price of electricity is set so that a weighted average of deviations between price and the utilityís marginal cost of generating electricity is zero. Consequently, net metering typically is not optimal for non-intermittent DG technologies. Net metering can be optimal for intermittent DG technologies because DG payments do not a §ect the amount of electricity produced with the installed capacity of such technologies. Therefore, DG capacity charges can be set to induce e¢cient intermittent capacity investment, given unit DG payments that reáect prevailing retail prices of electricity.
Fifth, net metering typically is not optimal even for intermittent DG technologies when the regulator is unable to set DG capacity charges. In this case, unit DG payments for electricity must be designed to induce e¢cient DG capacity investment whereas retail prices 24 optimally are designed to induce e¢cient electricity consumption.
Sixth, Öxed retail charges for electricity can play an important role in inducing e¢cient electricity consumption, particularly when they do not a §ect the demand for electricity. Such
Öxed charges enable the regulator to set unit retail electricity prices to reáect the utilityís marginal cost of production while ensuring the utility a normal expected proÖt. 54
Seventh, the presence of social losses from externalities a §ects optimal retail prices and DG payments in intuitive ways. In particular, retail prices of electricity are increased above the utilityís marginal cost of generating electricity to reáect the marginal social loss from externalities associated with the utilityís electricity generation. In addition, the unit DG payment for electricity is increased above the utilityís marginal cost of generating electricity to the extent that losses from externalities decline as production is shifted from the utility to distributed generators. These changes imply that common net metering policies typically are not optimal unless distributed generation of electricity entails no social losses from externalities.
In closing, we note that although we have considered a fairly broad set of policy instruments for the regulator, an even more comprehensive set of instruments warrants formal investigation. Additional instruments of potential interest include demand charges (e.g., Hledik, 2014; Faruqui and Hledik, 2015; Brown and Sappington, 2016b) and policies that promote demand response (e.g., Chao, 2011; Brown and Sappington, 2016a ) and energy conservation (e.g., Brennan, 2010b; Chu and Sappington, 2013) . 55 Future research also might consider the changes that arise in the presence of limited consumer information, consumer risk aversion, and di §erential concerns about the welfare of di §erent consumers (e.g., residen-tial vs. industrial consumers or residential consumers who can invest in DG technologies vs.
those who cannot). 56 Future research should also account for the fact that electricity production by a DG unit and the value of the electricity produced can vary substantially with the unitís geographic location (e.g., Antweiler, 2015; MIT Energy Initiative, 2016) . Location-speciÖc DG capacity charges may enhance welfare substantially in presence of pronounced geographic heterogeneity among DG units. 57 56 It can be shown that the key qualitative conclusions drawn above continue to hold when the regulator seeks to maximize a weighted average of the welfare of consumer D and the welfare of consumer N , while ensuring a reservation level of expected welfare for both consumers. In this setting, Öxed retail charges are set to deliver a higher level of welfare to the favored consumer while ensuring the less-favored consumer secures his reservation welfare level. Binding limits on feasible Öxed retail charges would introduce additional changes to the optimal unit retail prices of electricity. 57 In addition to accounting explicitly for relevant network congestion costs, future research should account for the large, non-divisible investments that are common in the electricity sector and for the fact that regulators often have limited knowledge of consumer preferences and industry production technologies. and $400/MWh (Branker et al., 2011; EIA, 2015a) . When the 30 percent federal income tax credit (ITC) is applied, these estimates decline to between $70 and $280/MWh. State subsidies further reduce these estimates to between $45 and $255/MWh (NCCETC, 2015a,b,c) .
We initially set a Di = 150, the midpoint of this lattermost range. We also set b D = 0:0038 to ensure ensure that the marginal cost of DG capacity when K Di = K D = 3; 254 (i.e., a D + 2 b D K D ) is 175, the midpoint of the range of estimated costs after applying the ITC.
Estimates of the cost of DG capacity using natural gas reciprocating engine and gas turbines range from $34:09 to $87:44/MWh (PaciÖCorp, 2013, Table 6 To capture the social losses from environmental externalities ( ($)), we introduce the parameters e c = 37:231, e g = 21:029, and e o = 0, where e j is the estimated unit loss from environmental externalities for production technology j 2 fc; g; og, where c denotes coal, g denotes natural gas, and o denotes other. The e j estimate is the product of $38, the estimated social cost of a metric ton of CO 2 emissions (EPA, 2013), and the metric tons of CO 2 emissions that arise when technology j is employed to produce a MWh of electricity. 64 We assume t (Q v t ; Q i t ; Q n t ) = e v Q v t + e o Q i t + e g Q n t where e v = T c e c + T g e g + T o e o . 65 63 Q v = 24; 577 is the average MWhís of electricity sold daily by California utilities in 2014 and K G = 72; 926 is the MW of centralized non-renewable generation capacity in California at year-end 2014. Thus, the initial value for c v (and hence a v ) reáects the assumption that the welfare-maximizing level of capacity in the model is K G . 64 EIA (2014a) estimates that 2:16 (1:22) pounds of carbon dioxide are emitted when a KWh of electricity is produced using a coal (natural gas) generating unit. These estimates are multiplied by 1; 000 to convert KWhs to MWhs, and divided by 2; 204:62 to convert pounds to metric tons. Thus, e c = 38 [ 2:16 ] 1;000 2;204:62 = 37:231 and e g = 38 [ 1:22 ] 1;000 2;204:62 = 21:029. 65 For simplicity, we abstract from the non-linearities that arise in practice as di §erent technologies are
